

The remaining five chapters are devoted to conversations which are more explicitly targeted at explication of Naess's philosophical ideas, principles, and attitudes. For example, there is an extensive discussion of Naess's long devotion to empiricism as a methodology by which to bring clarity and precision to philosophical inquiry and discourse, a devotion which persisted until the late 1960s. There is an equally detailed treatment of the philosophical methodology which came to replace his empiricist, behavioral approach, a view which Naess refers to as 'possibilism'. And, of great importance for those interested in deep ecology, the final three chapters contain discussions targeted at the grounding ideas of deep ecology, such as 'Self-realisation' and 'identification'.

For those sympathetic to the ideals and principles of deep ecology, *Is it Painful to Think?* will represent a return to basics, as it were. As a true dialogue in which, as Rothenberg notes in the preface, Naess refuses to be pinned down to one viewpoint, one school of thought, or style of life, the reader is given direct access to the style of philosophizing which Naess came to advocate later in life as the most profitable for intelligent inquiry. Since he introduced the term 'deep ecology' to academic environmental philosophy in his seminal 1973 essay, 'The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movements', Naess has argued that the kind of ecological thinking embodied in deep ecology has its origins in the intuitions spawned by one's immediate experiences of their environment, cultural and natural, and not in the desire to generate philosophical or logical argumentation. The point of doing 'ecophilosophy', as Naess has called it, is to further articulate and develop these intuitions, considering along the way, the implications they may have for other beliefs and values one may hold. The eventual outcome is an 'ecosophy', which amounts to an integrated personal philosophy which is rooted in the experience of being a part of nature. Ecophilosophy does not represent, for Naess, an exercise in systematic, philosophical theory building, in the traditional Western sense; it is not an effort at constructing rigorous, philosophical arguments to be evaluated using the tools of logic. The dialogues contained in *Is it Painful to Think?* do a much better job of conveying the spirit and tenor of Naess's approach to philosophizing than do his more academic writings.

Readers more critical of deep ecology, especially those dissatisfied with its apparent lack of philosophical rigor and resistance to articulating specific environmental policy, may find the biographical material interesting, but will probably find few, if any, new considerations which might assuage their intellectual worries about deep ecology. Those chapters devoted specifically to discussions of ideas endemic to deep ecology leave many questions unaddressed, and really present no new insights into those basic ideas which cannot be found in other, more structured essays on deep ecology.

Overall, *Is it Painful to Think?* is an admirable work, especially given Rothenberg's intent in collecting, editing, and publishing the interviews. If the desire for substantial philosophical explication is set aside, and one reads the text with an eye towards discovering 'the spirit of the man', *Is it Painful*

to Think? is a rewarding journey into the intellectual spirit of Arne Naess, and, by association, those who follow him in the pursuit of a powerful, yet personal understanding of humanity's place in and relationship to the natural world.

Brian K. Steverson
Gonzaga University

Zachary Seech

Open Minds and Everyday Reasoning.
Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing
Company. Pp. xv + 288.
US \$22.50 (paper: ISBN 0-534-17882-0).

Open Minds and Everyday Reasoning is designed to be used as a textbook for a one-semester introductory course on critical thinking. It is a good book. Seech writes clearly and knows his audience. He succeeds at helping the reader become better at arguing, explaining, and decision-making.

The book is in four parts. The first part is designed to help readers understand how they will benefit from studying the book. Seech points out that all of us are 'logically vulnerable' (2). Often we are not able to be objective. In a casual manner he helps us recognize this. In the first part he also helps the reader think about ways of communicating in more objective ways with our opponents. He advises us to be careful about using emotional language and to put ourselves in the shoes of our opponents. The second part helps the reader answer questions of the following sort: 'Could I restate my sentence so that it would be more precise?' and 'Could I define the notions involved in my claims so that they would be more accurate?' In this part Seech also talks about spotting 'sidetracks' (49), such as references to 'straw men' (50). (Throughout the book, Seech chooses casual names to refer to virtues and vices in informal reasoning.) In this part Seech introduces the reader to familiar Beardsley diagrams for mapping arguments. In the third part Seech discusses the evaluation of arguments. He introduces (108) his 'R-E-T' method for evaluating arguments: i) Are the reasons the *Right* kind?, ii) Are the reasons *Enough*, and iii) Are the reasons *True*? Next he gives a discussion of some standard informal fallacies, such as Division (but not Composition?), and a discussion of some valid forms of inference, such as *modus ponens* and *modus tollens*, as well as some invalid forms of inference, such as *affirming the consequent*. For the most part, validity is discussed informally. No truth-tables or Venn diagrams are presented, for example. Seech's 'evalu-

ative mappings' (108) join mappings with the R-E-T method. The fourth part helps the reader think more clearly about writing, statistical reasoning, and decision-making.

All chapters conclude with practical activities. As Seech says, many of these activities may be performed in a variety of ways and still be correct. Solutions for some exercise are given.

Two problems with the book need be mentioned. 1. Seech's discussion of validity and inductive strength is marred. His opening remarks (101-7) about these concepts are okay. To evaluate an inference ask how likely it is the conclusion is true given the premises are assumed to be true. However, later (202, for example) inference is linked with form. He suggests that good reasoning requires a certain type of form. The reader is given only a small list of valid forms and has no idea about what form many of the arguments labelled 'valid' or 'inductively strong' have. What is more disturbing is that Seech suggests (163-4) that all instances of invalid forms are invalid. This is an egregious mistake. By his opening remarks about validity it follows that an instance of the invalid form *affirming the consequent* is valid if the conclusion is necessarily true or if the minor premise implies the conclusion, for example. 2. Some of Seech's analyses of reasoning are not carefully worked out. See, for example, his analysis of example 4.2.1.b on p. 68: '... one man [Saddam Hussein] has made life truly miserable for tens of thousands of people. Billions of dollars have been lost on the stock market.' He attempts (271) a full analysis of this passage. According to it Hussein isn't referred to in the premises. Surely the arguer must be using the claim that Hussein caused the stock market losses as evidence for the conclusion. Oddly, Seech says that '... when stocks go down, billions of dollars *can* be lost by investors' (my italics) is an unstated premise that helps support the intermediate conclusion that 'billions of dollars *have* been lost by investors' (my italics) (271). The so-called 'intermediate conclusion' is not a conclusion at all.

Despite the above negative remarks, Seech's book should be considered by anyone who teaches a critical-thinking course.

Fred Johnson

Colorado State University

E.L. Stone

Pleasura & Realitas.

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Stone offers this account of the dialectic of desire and constraint as a skeleton key to human history. He identifies the human wants which drive the movement of history as 'Pleasura', while the social need for a political order which limits the aspirations of individuals is identified as 'Realitas'. Stone asserts that to read history as a dialectical process of Pleasura and Realitas — a dialectic which, he argues, offers no promise of completion or synthesis — renders intelligible both the past course of human history as well as the general direction of its future.

There is a distinctly nostalgic flavour to a theory of this kind. Theoretical claims in respect to the dialectical intelligibility of history have gradually fallen into disrepute for much of this century — casualties, in their various incarnations, of World War One, the writings of Karl Popper and the dismantling of the Berlin Wall. Indeed, the theoretical resources which Stone draws upon here are largely, if not exclusively, nineteenth century in origin: in particular the early Nietzsche's distinction between Dionysian and Apollonian instincts and its psychologised counterpart in Freud's distinction between Id and Ego. Even the metaphors in which Stone presents his dialectic of Pleasura and Realitas are drawn from that quintessentially nineteenth century piece of technology which is the steam engine. Pleasura, we are told in a typical passage: 'is indeed a pent-up force: so long as there is more external pressure than internal upward-thrusting pressure, it will remain repressed and under control. It will increase in inverse ratio to the decrease of external pressure. By "external pressure" we mean all of those psychological and physical elements outside the Pleasura, the positive application of which represses it' (15). On the basis of this pipefitter's understanding of historical phenomena Stone allows himself to speculate that 'the onflow of human history could be controllable, to a certain extent' (11).

However, while Freud's psychology owed much to steam power in rendering a thermodynamics of the soul, we have alternative technological models from which to choose and one might well ask whether thermodynamics is really adequate to the task of making sense of historical phenomena. To cite but one example, human society is presently being transformed by the microchip in ways that do not appear to lend themselves in any obvious way to explanation or prediction on the basis of Stone's dialectic of container and contained; yet microchip technology is undoubtedly effecting a profound social revolution in changing the way that we work, play and educate ourselves — quite likely in ways that are unforeseeable at present. Yet transformation from within by technological development is probably more typical of historical movement than the relatively rare phenomena of popular revolution and world war upon which Stone concentrates his discussion.